Showing posts with label Public Choice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Public Choice. Show all posts

Sunday, February 17, 2008

Thank God for Government Hospitals

From BBC News:

A fully-equipped hospital that lay unused for two years has burned to the ground in northern Nigeria.

"The General Hospital in Maiduguri was built in 2006 but
the state government refused to open it until the president came to cut
the ribbon. The president was due to visit the hospital next month to open it...

Borno was recently hit by a measles outbreak that killed hundreds of children [and] existing hospitals in Borno are poorly equipped and overcrowded. Angry residents ... gathered around the burned hospital and shouted abuse at the alleged arsonists, local papers reported..."

--snip--

One question: It's understandable why they are mad at the arsonists, but why not be mad at the government? It seems to me that the politicians willing to let hundreds of people die (And in all likelihood it is probably way more than just the hundreds from the measles outbreak) in order to satisfy their demand for political grandstanding is the real problem here.

Wednesday, February 6, 2008

And what if I don't like either choice?

I spoke earlier of the changes in the works at the ABC. Today, they have announced a number of changes in the services they will have on offer, including adding another channel and increasing the variety of programmes on offer. This sounds nice. After all, any free market economist will tell you that choice is good! However, markets work not just by offering you choices, but by rewarding producers who offer good choices and punishing producers who offer crappy choices, because after all, producing another option for you to choose among entails a cost. It's not the addition of more choices that drives markets to efficiency, it's the market process of entrepreneurs identifying an unmet demand that they can provide at a profit that drives markets to efficiency.

Sure, it's entirely possible that the new programming offered by the ABC could potentially earn a profit, and thus be efficient. It could be that there is an unmet demand for televised Australian ballet and opera, and the ABC is the entrepreneur that the market needs to provide this content. Or it could be that it simply is not worth the cost. My money is on the latter, and that we'll see the subsidy to the ABC rise as a result.

Monday, February 4, 2008

Centralizing the Federal Budget

At first glance, centralizing the Federal Government's technology budget seems like a good idea. After all, it follows the best practice of private industry, where firms typically rely upon procurement departments for purchasing. In so doing, firms are able to save money by streamlining purchasing processes, leveraging their position as volume purchasers to negotiate lower input prices, and take advantage of economies of specialization. This all sounds good, but I remain very skeptical of Finance Minister Lindsay Tanner's plan. Not only is it the case that what is true of firms is not necessarily true of governments, but this plan also has the ability to have a huge effect on the balance of power in Canberra.

Firms seek to cost minimize because any reduction in cost is translated directly into profit for the owners. But the profit motive that drives private procurement departments is conspicuously absent in governments. Assuming there are cost savings, then, where do they go? The obvious analogue to owners in this situation is taxpayers. If the reduction in spending was returned to taxpayers in the form of a reduced tax burden, great, that is the best outcome possible. But this overlooks an important element of human action--if you want people to engage in certain types of behaviour, you need to make sure their payoff from that behaviour is higher than if they did anything else...in this context, the question we should ask is what incentive does the Finance department have to engage in the effort required to reduce costs, when the fruits of their labour go to the taxpayer, not them? The answer is very little. The same could be said about the second best case of using the reduction in costs to fund other government projects, like education or roads or something. Unless the Finance department sees a big chunk of the cash, they are not going to do it efficiently. If this goes forward, I see two likely outcomes. Note that they are not mutually exclusive.

The first outcome is that we might see a "second best" type solution which involves significant gold plating on the part of the Finance department. Gold plating occurs when a firm or agency is limited in the amount of profit they can earn (for example, the Finance department cannot earn a profit!). This limitation obviously reduces the incentives to increase revenues and reduce costs, since the only reason they might want to expend the effort to do these things is if they can get some private benefit from those revenue increases/cost reductions. And the way to do that in this situation is through overcapitalization (on-the-job consumption). For example, say your government agency is operating efficiently with $3m in revenues but $2m in costs. You can either return $1m to the federal government at the end of the year (and get nothing out of it), or spend the extra $1m on overcapitalization (things like computer upgrades or extra workers, that add capacity that you will not need or use) or on-the-job consumption (hiring limos instead of taxis, flying first class, and hiring former playboy playmates who can't read, let alone type, as personal assistants). This, in turn, increases your costs to $3m. On the whole, this gold plating equilibrium would be more efficient than the current system. Not necessarily by much, but the benefit is there. Cost savings will be made, but most of them will be passed on to Lindsay Tanner, not the taxpayer.

The second outcome, which I think to be far more concerning, is that this change would generate a great deal of "gatekeeper" type power to the Finance department. That is to say, the Finance department, and the Finance Minister himself (Lindsay Tanner), would have oversight power over the workings of all of the various cabinet agencies. After all, these rules would "enable the Department of Finance to withhold funds until certain milestones used by agencies to justify projects have been met." And in general, adding individuals with gatekeeper power is bad news.

Really, this plan is just a power play by Lindsay Tanner. He is using the guise of adopting best practices as exist in the corporate world to consolidate power for himself and his agency.